The oversight mechanisms built into Section 702, which involve all three branches of government, provided the insight and transparency necessary to surface the issue and address it. To me, the important lesson here is that the system worked. New technology and new practices led to new concerns, which led to new rules. This all happened as storage capacity and search capability continued their exponential expansion. As the practice became more widespread, however, public concerns grew about “reverse targeting” or routine checks for U.S. At first, for many it was hard to see how searching information that had already been collected pursuant to court-approved procedures would cause a problem. Queries of previously collected information are a great example. And because law enforcement officers and intelligence officers are always thinking of new ways to use the information and systems available to them – for good-faith reasons related to keeping the nation safe – it is important to keep tabs on, and think critically about, those new uses. persons and people within the United States have to be periodically updated. In particular, because of the global nature of communications and travel, the built-in safeguards to prevent targeting of U.S. My views on Section 702 – which are my own and not those of any employer, past or present – come more from my experience as an operations and oversight attorney and policy counsel than my time as a national security prosecutor.Īnd I also think it should be updated, consistent with the history of updates to FISA as the technology, scale, use, and public perception of foreign intelligence surveillance have evolved. I worked in the Department of Justice’s National Security Division in three capacities: as a FISA operations and oversight attorney, as a national security policy counsel, and as a cyber and counterespionage prosecutor. But I do want to distinguish Section 702, which is a foreign intelligence tool, from a classic criminal investigative tool. It is a fast and efficient way to obtain important national security information in a manner that complies with the Constitution. Yes I think it is imperative to reauthorize Section 702. Where do you fall on this debate? From your experience investigating and litigating prominent national security cases and as an intelligence operations attorney, do you think Section 702 is as imperative as the Executive branch has stated? And likewise, do you think any reforms to the program are necessary or appropriate? The Biden administration and other supporters of the Section 702 program argue that it should be reauthorized as is others believe that it should be overhauled (if not allowed to sunset). There are loud voices on either end of the spectrum with regard to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the intelligence authority set to expire at the end of the year unless reauthorized by Congress. Editor’s Note: This is part of a multi-part series on the FISA Section 702 reauthorization and reform debate.
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